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Introduction
The consensus that institutions are a key determinant of economic development has led international organizations to devote attention and resources to improving the institutional frameworks of developing countries. Various conventions have accordingly been set up, such as the 1998 UN resolution or the 1999 OECD's "Convention on combating bribery." The political consensus is indeed backed by a parallel consensus based on results from a decade of empirical research. Spurred by the seminal papers of Mauro (1995) or Knack and Keefer (1995) , this line of research has repeatedly concluded that ailing institutions are associated with lower GDP per capita growth. Later studies, such as Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2000) , extended that finding to the level of per capita incomes. Hall and Jones (1999) furthermore observed that the bulk of the relationship between institutions and income runs through the impact of institutions on total factor productivity.
Although those consonant observations have drawn a consistent picture of the relationship between institutions and development, they all share a common drawback that may turn out to be crucial in the context of developing economies in particular: they use official output figures. However, official output figures neglect a sizeable part of economic activity, which takes place in the informal sector and therefore remains unrecorded in official statistics, namely the shadow economy. According to Schneider (2005a Schneider ( , 2005b , who defines the shadow economy as currently unregistered economic activities that contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product, the shadow economy amounted on average to 39 percent in developing countries, and up to 40 percent in transition countries in 2002/2003. Those figures consequently call for caution in interpreting empirical results emphasizing the negative impact of defective institutions on incomes. They in fact emphasize that official incomes decrease when, for instance, corruption increases or the rule of law deteriorates. They do not guarantee, however, that the same holds for total income, defined as the sum of official and unofficial incomes.
Previous research moreover suggests that the shadow economy frolics in countries mired with defective institutions, thus acting as a substitute for the official economy. Johnson et al. (1997) , for instance, model corruption to reduce the shadow economy because corruption works as a form of taxation and regulation, which drives entrepreneurs underground. Hindriks et al. (1999) also argue that the shadow economy is a complement to corruption. This is because, in their view, tax payers can collude with corrupt inspectors so that the latter underreport the tax liability of the tax payer in exchange for a bribe. According to the empirical results in Dreher and Schneider (2006) , better institutions reduce the size of the shadow economy. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1998a) observed a one-point increase in Transparency International's corruption index to imply a 5.1 points fall in the share of the shadow economy.
To summarize, good institutions seem to increase official output, while at the same time reducing unofficial output. One may accordingly contend that the observed correlation between bad institutions and lower income may be less substantial than it first seems. It may only result from a drop in recorded output. In other words, production might not disappear, it might only go underground, which is a special case of Hirschman (1970) 's exit option, as Schneider and Enste (2000) argue. Even if the substitution from official to shadow production would be imperfect, the negative impact of bad institutions on overall income would be dampened. This intuition is consistent with Johnson et al. (1998b) , reporting the relationship between corruption and growth to become insignificant once the shadow economy is added as an explanatory variable. At any rate, a systematic investigation of the relationship between institutions and total income, as opposed to official income, is warranted. This is precisely the aim of this paper.
To anticipate our main results, we confirm the positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy reported in the previous literature. However, once output is corrected for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker.
The impact of institutions on total ("corrected") factor productivity even becomes insignificant.
Our line of reasoning is along the following steps. In a first section, we correct official output figures for the shadow economy. We then compare the distribution of per capita incomes using both raw and corrected figures. In a second section we probe deeper in the impact of the shadow economy on output by performing a development accounting analysis, following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) . Namely, differences in incomes are broken down into differences in factor endowments and differences in total factor productivity. The next section uses that decomposition to determine the channels through which institutions affect income per capita. We thus check whether institutions are still significantly correlated with output per capita and total factor productivity once corrected for the size of the shadow economy. The last section concludes.
Correcting output figures
The prerequisite to correcting output figures is to measure the shadow economy. Data for the shadow economy are taken from Schneider (2005a Schneider ( , 2005b . 1 According to these data, the average size of the shadow economy in percent of official GDP in 37 African states is 41 percent. In Central and South America the size of the shadow economy amounts to 41 percent. In Asia the average value is much lower (29 percent).
Regarding the transition countries in the sample, the respective value is 38 percent, and for the OECD 17 percent. Looking at the unweighted average of the 145 countries in the sample, the average size of the shadow economy is 34 percent in 1999/2000. We added the shadow economy output to the official output figures, thereby obtaining what we refer to as total output. The data on official output stem from the Penn World Tables version 6.2. Table 1 below compares official (y) and total (y tot ) output per worker measured in PPP dollars. We focus on the year 2000, because it maximizes the number of observations in our sample. We report data on two samples: First, we describe the largest sample for which we could find data on output per worker and the shadow economy, which features 136 1 We test for the robustness of our results by employing alternative estimates of the shadow economy below.
2 These external estimates are derived employing the currency demand method. For the sources of these external estimates see Schneider (2005b, page 21) . The most widely used methods to calculate the size of the shadow economy are described in Appendix E. For more details see Schneider (2007). countries. Second, we use a restricted sample for which we could not only find data on output per worker and the shadow economy but also on human and physical capital stocks. As Table 1 shows, adding the output produced in the shadow economy to official output increases both the mean and the standard deviation of output. This is not surprising.
Since the shadow economy can by definition not be negative, our correction can only increase output. However, Table 1 also reports the ratio of maximum to minimum output. This ratio decreases with the inclusion of the shadow economy to the output figures in both samples, which suggests that the distribution of outputs is more concentrated.
This is due to the fact that the shadow economy tends to be larger in poorer countries.
To be more specific, the coefficient of correlation between the share of the shadow economy and official output per worker is −0.67 in the larger sample and -0.71 in the restricted sample.
Official figures therefore tend to overestimate the differences in output across countries. It is thus unsurprising that the observed differences in outputs are reduced when the shadow economy is taken into account. In the next section we investigate the impact of this correction on the results of development accounting.
Development accounting with the shadow economy
As official figures are biased downward in poorer countries, they may lead to underestimating these countries' productivities. In this section, we therefore estimate productivities across countries with and without the shadow economy, and compare the results. To do so we first need to present the development accounting method and the data on which it was applied.
The development accounting method
The basic aim of development accounting is estimating countries' outputs as a function of their factor endowments and comparing the estimated figures with actual output figures. The difference between the two gives total factor productivity (TFP), or the Solow residual, depending on the reader's optimism.
To do so, the standard method in the literature is the calibration approach surveyed by Caselli (2005) , and used by King and Levine (1994) , Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1999) , Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999) , among others. According to that method, an aggregate production function of the following form is assumed:
where Y is the country's output, and K its aggregate capital stock. L measures the country's number of workers, and h is the average human capital stock. Lh is therefore a measure of the labor force adjusted for its quality; α is a parameter that measures the contribution of capital to output. A is total factor productivity.
We rewrite the production function in per-worker terms, giving:
where lower-case letters refer to per-worker variables.
To compute A, one therefore needs a value for α and data on Y, K, L, and h. It is commonly assumed that a reasonable estimate for α is around 0.3, such as in Caselli (2005 When studying OECD countries, Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2007) also reject the 0.3 estimate and find that alpha robustly exceeds 0.5. However, the most systematic attempt at assessing the share of capital in a large sample of countries is Senhadji's (2000) , providing estimates for a sample of 88 developed and developing countries. He also rejects the estimate of 0.3. He moreover observes large cross-country variations in that parameter. However, the world mean and the world median are found to be 0.55 and 0.57, respectively.
As 0.3 therefore seems a very small value for α, and any exogenously imposed value is completely arbitrary, we endogenized the magnitude of that parameter, following various methods. Specifically, we first estimated the coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production function given by (2) on our cross-country sample. This allowed us to use both official and total output. We then used the panel dimension of our data over the period 1980-2000. 4 We first computed pooled and between regressions. We then ran a panel regression with fixed country effects and subsequently added fixed time effects. We also ran two random effect regressions, one including country effects only, and another including random time effects also.
The results are displayed in the appendix. Although the estimates of α vary from one regression to another, they remain in a fairly narrow range of 0.5-0.6. They approximately average to 0.57, which corresponds to Senhadji's (2000) estimate of the world median. We will therefore use that value in our calculations below. Note, however, that using the mean value of 0.55 obtained by Senhadji does not change our results. Arguably, an α οf 0.57 remains a conservative guess, as Senhadji (2000) reports estimates of alpha for individual countries or regions that often exceed it. This value of α allows investigating the impact of increasing the capital share in the production function, while leaving a role for differences in TFP in explaining cross-country differences in per worker output. As Caselli (2005) showed, variations in factor endowments explain the totality of cross-country differences in output per worker with values of α exceeding 0.6. However, we will test the robustness of our results by setting α to 0.6 in the last section of this paper. We also employ the value of 0.3 as proposed in much of the earlier literature.
The number of workers was computed from the Penn World Tables 6.2 dataset. 5 The human capital stock is usually computed as a function of years of schooling in the population. The last set of data required for our calculations is the stock of capital. We again followed the literature and computed it by applying the perpetual inventory method, where the capital stock of a particular year is defined as the sum of past investments to which a depreciation rate is applied. Hence, we assume that the capital stock is:
Again, data on real investment in PPP terms were obtained from the Penn World Tables 6.2. 6 That data is available from 1950 until 2004. However, not all countries have complete series for the entire period. We therefore restricted our analysis to countries for which the information was available at least from 1970.
To apply the above formula we, however, need the initial capital stock. Still following Caselli (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999) , we assume that the capital stock in the initial year is equal to its steady-state value in the Solow growth model, namely K 0 = I 0 / (g + δ), where δ is the depreciation rate, which is usually set to 0.06 in the literature, I 0 is the value of investment in the first year for which an observation is available, and g the average rate of growth for the investment series between that year and 1970. 7
Finally we used two definitions of output per worker. One was directly taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2 dataset. 8 The other was corrected for the shadow economy, like in the previous section. Overall we could obtain data on output per worker, physical capital, human 6 That is rgdpl*pop*ki in PWT6.2. 7 Note that the impact of K 0 on the capital stocks in 2000 is quite small, as we use no base year subsequent to 1970. Since the annual rate of depreciation is six percent, the maximum share of the initial capital stock still in use in 2000 cannot exceed 15% of its initial value.
capital, and the shadow economy for 76 countries in the year 2000. The key point now is to determine the extent to which the inclusion of the shadow economy in output figures affects the observed role of the residual in explaining cross-country income differences. Put differently, we aim at measuring the impact of that correction on the capacity of factor endowments to predict income differences. 9
To do so, we compare actual output per worker figures with output predicted by a model only considering factor endowments, that is y KH ≡ k α h 1−α , called the factor-only model.
We then assess its relevance by computing the two measures of success defined in Caselli (2005) . The first one is the ratio of the log-variance of the factor-only output to the log-variance of observed output. As it is sensitive to outliers, it is complemented by the ratio of the 90 th to the 10 th percentile of the factor-only output to the ratio of the 90 th to the 10 th percentile of observed output. More precisely, those measures are defined as: 
Results
The two measures of success were computed once with official output figures and once with output figures corrected for the shadow economy. Table 2 below displays the results of our calculations: The results displayed in table 2 are in line with the usual findings of the literature.
Namely, it appears that the factor-only model fails to account for all the variance of output.
However, the key finding of table 2 appears when comparing the results obtained with official 9 Note that we do not adjust input figures. The main reason for that is that we are not aware of estimates of the labor force and the capital stock in the shadow economy for a large enough sample of countries. We will, however, argue in the section on robustness checks that such correction would not greatly affect our results, and, if anything, would likely make them stronger.
figures to those obtained with corrected figures. We thus observe that the measures of success of the factor-only model are substantially greater when corrected figures are used instead of official figures. In our sample, the correction adds around twenty percentage points to those measures. Table 3 above provides more information on the impact of adding the shadow economy to official output figures. The distribution of official TFPs is described in the first line and the distribution of corrected TFPs (including the shadow economy) in the following line. The results of table 3 are reminiscent of those in table 1. Namely, it appears that both the mean and the standard deviation of TFPs increase when the shadow economy is taken into account. However, the distribution of TFPs becomes more concentrated around its mean, as the drop in the ratio of maximum to minimum TFP suggests. Here again, the rationale for this result stems from the fact that a smaller share of output is officially reported in poorer countries. Their TFP therefore stands to be relatively more underestimated than that of richer countries. As a result, correcting for the shadow economy leads to a more concentrated distribution of TFP. More generally, all the variables displayed in table 4 appear to be positively correlated with official output per worker. Richer countries also tend to be more productive. More remarkable, however, is the fact that the correlation of TFP with output decreases when the shadow output is added to official output. The intuition of that finding is that the share of the shadow economy tends to increase when income decreases. Poorer countries therefore report a smaller fraction of their total output. This introduces a systematic bias that results in underestimating TFP in poor countries, which increases the correlation between output and TFP. When this statistical artifact is corrected, the correlation between output and TFP consequently becomes less clear. This is precisely what our calculations reveal.
These results may cast some doubt on the usual finding that the quality of institutions is positively correlated with productivity, because the observed relationship may also be driven by unreported output. The next section investigates this possibility.
Do institutions really affect output and productivity after all?
Our chief measure of institutional quality is the rule of law, which has been an important As a first step, we see whether we can replicate previous results on the impact of the rule of law on the underground economy with our sample. We chose a parsimonious model, including per capita GDP as the only additional explanatory variable. Table A1 in Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term included but not reported. show that the impact of the rule of law on total output is smaller than its impact on official output. Our results show that improvements in the rule of law still increase output when the shadow economy is taken into account -the positive impact on official GDP apparently dominates the negative impact on the size of the shadow economy. According to the coefficients, an increase in the rule of law index by one point increases official output by 9.3 percent, while increasing total output by 8.6 percent only. With the rule of law index varying from -2.37 to 2.11 among the countries included in our sample, the difference between the parameters of the two models is non-negligible. It is significant at the one percent level. The standardized regression (beta) coefficients are 0.8 and 0.78, respectively.
As one potential problem with the analysis, however, institutions might well depend on GDP and could as such be endogenous. To control for potential endogeneity bias, we instrument the rule of law index employing the variables suggested in Hall and Jones (1999) as instruments for institutional quality. Their instruments measure the extent of Western influence in the sixteenth trough nineteenth century, being exogenous to GDP, but being highly correlated with institutions. According to Hall and Jones, European influence is unlikely to have been stronger in regions more likely to have higher GDP today. This is, first, because Europeans were conquering above all resource rich regions, which are not systematically among the countries with high output per worker today. Second, European influence concentrated on sparsely settled regions. As these frequently were regions with low productivity, there should again be no tendency for these regions to be among those with high output per worker today.
Still, past European influence is likely to be highly correlated with the rule of law. As
Hall and Jones (1999) point out, countries most strongly influenced by Western Europe are among those most likely to adopt favorable infrastructure. We employ the percentage of a country's population speaking one of the five primary Western European languages as their mother tongue. In addition, we use the absolute value of a country's latitude in degrees, measuring the distance from the equator. 11
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report the results of our instrumental variables approach.
As shown in the table, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels of significance. The instruments are jointly significant at the one percent level in both firststage regressions. In fact, the F-test statistic easily exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997), indicating some power of the instruments.
As can be seen, the impact of the rule of law on output remains significant at the one percent level in both specifications, with a positive coefficient. The coefficients show that an increase in the rule of law index by 0.01 increases official output by 13.1 percent, and total output by 12.3 percent. Again, the impact of the rule of law is thus smaller when focusing on total output as compared to official output. The difference in parameters of the two models is significant at the five percent level. 11 Hall and Jones provide two plausible motivations for this: First, Western European settlers were more likely to migrate to sparsely populated areas in the fifteenth century. Second, they were more likely to settle in regions with climate similar to Western Europe, which is true for regions far from the equator. Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term included but not reported. According to the results of both specifications, the rule of law significantly increases total factor productivity when official output is concerned. However, turning to total output, this result no longer holds. According to the OLS and instrumental variables estimates, the impact of the rule of law on total factor productivity no longer exists once controlled for the shadow economy. This result has important implications for empirical research on the impact of institutional quality on productivity. While good institutions increase official output, they at the same time decrease the size of the underground economy. As a consequence, total factor productivity does not seem to be affected by the quality of institutions. Regarding the control variables, table 6b shows that government consumption does not affect factor productivity in any specification, while productivity declines with inflation, at the five percent level of significance. The first-stage F-test indicates some power of the instruments, while the Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at conventional levels of significance. Overall, these results suggest a new implication of the results obtained for instance by Hall and Jones (1999) or Lambsdorff (2003) . Their finding that the quality of institutions affects official productivity may indeed be driven by the fact that they used official figures, and therefore underestimated output. Consequently, their estimates may not only imply that some production disappears in weak institutional frameworks, but also that some production goes underground. implies that the sum of the coefficients of institutions that appear in columns (2) to (5) of table 7 should equal the coefficient that appears in the first column. 12 Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term included but not reported.
According to Table 7 , total output increases with the rule of law at the one percent level of significance in the restricted sample of 76 countries, confirming the results of Table 5 .
The results also show that the impact of institutional quality on total output runs through its effect on physical capital, human capital, and TFP, but is partly compensated by its impact on the shadow economy. They, however, also imply that the by far biggest share of the impact of institutional quality on output is via the capital stock per worker.
Further discussion and tests for robustness
It may be argued that the concept of institutions is multifaceted, and that our results lack generality because we only focused on one indicator of institutional quality. As our first test of robustness, we therefore check whether our main results hold when using alternative indicators of institutional quality. We replicate the analyses displayed in tables 5 and 6a with According to all regressions, moreover, the coefficients of the institutional variables become smaller when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. In all regressions, the difference between the parameters of the two models is significant at the five percent level at least. Table A3 in the appendix shows how the choice of indicator affects the results for the impact of institutional quality on total factor productivity. As can be seen, the general picture is consistent with the results reported for the rule of law above. Focusing on the 2SLS results, better institutions increase official factor productivity in all regressions, at the one percent level of significance. Correcting for the size of the shadow economy, none of the coefficients remains significant at conventional levels. If one interprets those indicators as proxies for the same underlying phenomenon, one may conclude that our main results are robust to the choice of indicator of institutional quality. If one considers that those indicators measure different dimensions of the institutional framework, 13 one may also consider the differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients. They suggest that it is the quality of the regulatory framework and the voice and accountability indicators that have the largest impact.
One may also argue that the relationship may differ according to countries' development, because they operate in different economic and political environments. Our second test thus consists in splitting the sample according to income. Our high-income sample contains countries with per capita GDP above 6000 US$, which is the average value among our sample of countries. The low-income sample includes those with values below 6000 US$.
Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix show the results according to income groups. As can be seen in table A4, the results for the low-income group very much resemble those for the previous sample. Again, official and total output increase significantly with the rule of law; again, the coefficient declines in magnitude once accounted for the shadow economy. In the group of countries with high income, there is a substantial decline in the magnitude of the impact of the rule of law on output when we take account of the shadow economy. In the 2SLS regressions, however, the impact of the rule of law is no longer significant at conventional levels. The small number of countries does not seem to allow the identification of a significant impact here.
According to table A5, the previous results regarding total factor productivity hold for the sample of 50 low-income countries, while neither official nor total productivity are affected in the sample of 26 countries with above average per capita GDP. This suggests that the relationship that was previously observed was mainly driven by low-income countries.
We also replicate the analysis of total factor productivity setting α to 0.6 and, respectively, 0.3, which can be considered as extreme values for the share of capital suggested in the previous literature. While it is well known that the results of development accounting severely depend on the choice of α  , and we consider the mean value of 0.57 to be the appropriate one for our sample of countries, this provides an interesting test for the robustness of our results. Table A5 in the appendix shows that using a value of 0.6 confirms the results obtained previously. Employing a value of 0.3, the results also show that improving the rule of law significantly increases official productivity. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly larger than with higher values of α. More to the point, and contrary to the results obtained above, productivity remains correlated with the rule of law, at the one percent level of significance even when the shadow economy is added to output. The rationale for this result is that decreasing α reduces the role of the physical capital stock in explaining TFP differences. As the variance of the physical capital stock is larger than the variance of the human capital stock, this leaves a larger fraction of the variation of output unexplained by factor endowments. Moreover, as table 7 shows, the impact of institutions on output mainly goes through its impact on capital. As a result, using a lower α increases not only the Solow residual but also its correlation with institutions. Unsurprisingly therefore, the regression's R 2 when TFP is regressed on institutions is larger when α is 0.3. It simply reflects the fact that the impact of institutions on the capital stock is partly neglected when TFP is computed with a small α, which overstates the correlation between institutions and productivity. This result notwithstanding, one should, however, notice that the coefficient of the rule of law index diminishes when total output is used to compute TFP instead of official output. This therefore again suggests a substitution of shadow output to official output when the institutional framework deteriorates.
The impact of not correcting input figures for the shadow economy also deserves some comments. This concern first hinges on labor figures. Following the rest of the development accounting literature, we proxy the labor force by the working age population. There is therefore no reason to correct those figures for the shadow economy, unless one suspects the existence of "shadow inhabitants." Admittedly, the ideal concept of labor inputs would be the number of hours worked. Unfortunately, figures on the number of worked hours are scarce, let alone figures on hours worked in the shadow economy. At the same time, with the limited data available, Caselli (2005) shows that taking into account differences in hours worked is unlikely to affect the outcome of development accounting analyses. Not adjusting labor inputs should therefore prove of little importance for our results.
The same concern holds for the capital stock, which we do not correct for the shadow economy either. 14 This concern deserves several comments. First, ever since the ILO's (1972) seminal study of the informal sector, it has been stressed that small scale activities dominate that sector, at least in developing economies, and that it therefore generates low income and little accumulation, if any, as Gërxhani (2004) points out. Loayza (1996) Table A7 in the appendix reports the results for the impact of the rule of law on official and total output, while table A8 replicates the previous analysis for factor productivity. As can be seen, our previous results are confirmed to some extent. For samples varying between 33 and 69 countries, all estimates confirm the decline in the impact of the rule of law on output once corrected for the shadow economy. However, again, all estimates stay significant at the ten percent level at least. Turning to Total Factor Productivity, the OLS results confirm the results reported above. While official output rises significantly with a better rule of law, this relationship is no longer significant once the underground economy is accounted for. However, when estimated with 2SLS, the previous positive impact of the rule 15 One should also bear in mind that this concern only affects our findings on the relationship between TFP and institutions but not those on the relationship between output and institutions. 16 Data for developed countries are calculated employing the currency demand method for the years 1990-1993. MIMIC estimates for 1990-1993 from Loayza (1996) . Data for Asia and Africa are from Lacko (1996) and are based on the electricity method. See Appendix E for a short description of these methods and Schneider (2007) and Schneider and Enste (2000) for more details. 17 More specifically, electricity-based estimates rather than MIMIC estimates are used for Latin America whenever available. For transition economies, 27 electricity-based estimates for the years 1990-1993 rather than for 1995 are used. Data for most developed countries are also calculated employing the electricity-based method (for the years 1989-1990).
of law no longer prevails. According to the results, the coefficients remain positive for official productivity, but turn negative for corrected productivity, which is again in line with our previous results. Due to the substantially reduced sample size, however, the coefficients are (in some cases marginally) insignificant.
To summarize, our results are very robust regarding the indicator of institutional quality and how we measure the size of the shadow economy. In line with the previous literature, we find, however, that our main results to some extent depend on the choice of α, the contribution of capital to output. While our results hold when employing a reasonable upper bound of α of 0.6, they do not hold when setting α to 0.3, which is the long run average for the US (but clearly inappropriate as average value for the countries among our sample).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we re-examined the nexus between output, productivity, and institutions, while taking account of the importance of the shadow economy across the world. With that end in view, we studied the distribution and institutional determinants of output and total factor productivity (TPF), and compared the results obtained with official output and total output, defined as the sum of output produced in the official and shadow economy.
According to our results, the distribution of output becomes less dispersed when official output figures are corrected for the shadow economy. This is due to the fact that the share of unrecorded activity is larger in poorer countries. Those countries' total production therefore tends to be underestimated by official figures.
To check how the omission of the shadow economy from official output figures may bias productivity measures, we performed a development accounting analysis with both official and corrected output figures. Our results show that using official figures underestimates total factor productivity, especially in poor countries. Moreover, we observe that correcting output for the shadow economy leads to an increase in the predictive power of the factor-only model. Part of the puzzle of the limited ability of factor-endowments to explain cross-country differences in output per worker may thus be explained by the existence of the shadow economy.
To move to a deeper level of explanation of differences in countries' economic performance, we studied the impact of the quality of the institutional framework. While we could replicate the usual association of output and TFP with institutions when we used official figures, we obtained more qualified results once employing corrected output figures. Namely, although total output is significantly positively correlated with institutional quality, the estimated impact of institutions is smaller than the one obtained with official output. Even more striking is the impact of our correction on the relationship between TFP and institutions.
More specifically, even though we observe the usual positive correlation between TFP and institutional quality when output is measured by official figures, this correlation loses significance when corrected output is used instead. This finding survived a series of robustness checks. In the least, our result calls for a reinterpretation of earlier studies that have emphasized the relationship between measured TFP and institutional quality. Our results suggest that part of the observed relationship reported in the previous literature is not due to a reduction of output, but instead due to a switch to the informal sector.
Our results have broad implications for the empirical literature on the determinants and consequences of GDP. Since the shadow economy tends to be higher in countries with lower official GDP, results employing uncorrected figures will reflect this bias. Whenever the interest of the researcher is on income, instead of official income, corrected figures should be used instead of the official ones.
What our results underline at the same time is that development accounting is a powerful tool of analysis that still needs improvement. This paves the way for future exciting research that may still change our understanding of the determinants of countries' relative economic performance around the world. Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1%.
Appendix Appendix A: Regression results
Constant term included but not reported. Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Constant term included but not reported. Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1%.
Constant term included but not reported. Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
Constant term included but not reported. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Fixed effects are not reported. Table D2 displays the results of our panel estimations. They were run on a sample of 79 countries and five years (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000) for which we have data on both human and physical capital stocks. As the shadow economy data do not go sufficiently back in time, we had to focus on official output in our computations. F-tests support the existence of country-specific effects while Hausman tests accept the random one-way model, but marginally reject the random effect model. However the estimated values of α display little variation across estimations. The mean value of that parameter is α ≅ 0.57.
Appendix B: Sources and Definitions

Appendix D: Estimations of the production function
